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《制度经济学研究》第二十三辑标题、编辑、摘要、关键词
金沙电子游戏:2009年04月15日 00:00   编辑:leo   点击:[]

《制度经济学研究》2009年第1期(总第23辑)标题、编辑、摘要等(中英文)

1、标题:认知理性和演化经济学方法论的发展

编辑:黄凯南

【摘 要】基于建构理性和演化理性的辨析,本文认为,由于认知的局限性和世界的复杂性,理性既不是完全建构也不是完全演化,而是一种认知理性。认知理性体现了认知科学和经济学的结合,是 一个更为一般化的理性概念,能够调和演化和建构的范式冲突。可以从三个维度来阐释认知理性,即生物演化维度、个体心理维度和社会学问维度,各个维度上认知变量的相互作用共同决定了个体认知理性的实质内涵。本文还探讨了三种(无意识、弱意识和强意识)个体认知行为模型。基于认知理性,文章最后指出,个体与制度构成了经济研究的二重本体,演化经济学的方法论应该基于个体与制度的互动主义。

【关键词】认知理性、建构理性、演化理性、演化经济学方法论

中图分类号:F011 文献标识码:A

2、标题:国有上市企业违规行为监管的执法选择性分析

编辑:杨晓维 赵娟

上市企业违规行为会损害投资者的合法权益,当这种损害较为严重时,投资者就会退出交易,导致证券市场投资不足、效率低下。因此,我国出台了一系列法律法规规范上市企业行为。但在实际监管操作中,相应法律法规并没有得到有效实行。经常是监管者依据不同情势,有意识、主动地选择放松监管或过度监管,甚至运动式监管,本文均称为选择性监管,或称为监管的选择性。本文将基于戴治勇和杨晓维的选择性执法理论,对我国上市企业关联交易监管中的“选择性监管”行为进行分析。

关键词直接监管成本,间接监管成本,随机性监管,选择性监管

中图分类号:F121.21 文献标识码:A

3、标题:转型时期的税收竞争、地方公共服务与经济表现

编辑:孙柳媚 王 争

【摘 要】本文旨在探讨转型时期中国的地区间税收竞争模式,及其对地方公共服务和经济表现的影响。利用1978-2005年的省级面板数据,本文构造了一个检验税收竞争效应的经验分析框架。第一步,大家通过估计税负反应函数确认了整个转型时期省际间税收竞争的存在性,并且发现税收竞争主要以税收模仿的形式存在着。而且大家还发现公共服务的投入产出效率在时间趋势上有明显的下降趋势。第二步,文章通过计量手段来识别其中的作用链条。主要发现表明:(1)税收竞争作为一种政策手段,不但没有能够很好地促进公共服务效率的提高,反而还导致了公共服务产出的下降。(2)在另一方面,税收竞争对经济表现却有积极的直接促进效应。从现实角度来看,这种特殊的作用关系与中国特有的政治晋升模式和财政联邦制有密切关系,大家为此进行了说明。

【关键词】税收竞争 公共服务 经济表现 面板数据

中图分类号:F062.6 文献标识码:A

4、标题:地方政府竞争与经济发展模式趋同:基于苏南和温州的分析

编辑:江静 陈柳

“苏南模式”和“温州模式”长期以来一直是两种色彩鲜明的区域经济发展模式,但近年来两个区域的发展方式却出现了惊人的趋同。本文从地方政府竞争视角对这一观察进行了说明。地方官员在转型时期比较特殊的政治晋升锦标赛下,将以相对短期的经济增长为目标,在这一约束下的竞争行为的选择是有限的。地方政府的竞争行为主要是招商引资以及局部的经济体制的改革。这种竞争行为的趋同导致了区域经济发展模式的趋同。

关键词地方政府竞争,经济发展模式,趋同,苏南模式,温州模式

中图分类号:F061.2 文献标识码:A

5、标题:制度变迁、劳动力流动和经济绩效

编辑:周 勤 杜 凯 蔡银寅

】 新古典劳动力流动模型的一个重要前提是劳动力可以自由流动。但是,由于我国劳动力户籍以及城乡就业市场分割等一系列制度条件约束,劳动力无法实现自由的流动,这就导致了不能将新古典方法直接应用于我国的现实分析。因此,在新古典理论模型的基础上,本文建立了制度约束条件下部门间劳动力流动的均衡模型,并运用1949―2006年我国各地区数据,系统考察制度变迁对劳动力流动和经济绩效产生的影响。研究认为,我国的劳动力流动带有明显的制度约束特征,每一次重大制度变迁的背后,都伴随着劳动力流动和经济绩效的起伏。制度变迁决定了劳动力的流动速度,并且直接影响了经济绩效。

关键词制度约束动态均衡劳动力流动经济绩效

中图分类号F241.3 文献标识码A

6、标题:职业声誉关注、互助合作与工资契约研究

编辑:黄 亮

摘 要】在长期重复的团队关系下,工资契约的业绩导向类型、各任务的能力之间的相关性和各任务的外生冲击之间的相关性等因素是影响团队成员的职业声誉关注和互助合作的重要因素。如果工资契约是不可契约化的固定工资契约,那么在个人业绩导向的契约下,各任务的能力之间的相关性高于各任务的外生冲击之间的相关性是激发团队成员的职业声誉关注和互助合作的必要条件;在团队业绩导向的契约下,团队业绩导向的契约总是可以激发团队成员的职业声誉关注和互助合作,而且其契约绩效优于个人业绩导向的契约。

关键词】职业声誉关注 互助合作 工资契约

中图分类号:F272.92 文献标识码:A

7、标题:法治水平、经济自由化和新企业进入――跨国经验研究

编辑:于明超

本文以法治水平和经济自由化为例,以新企业进入为对象分析了制度互补性的重要性。大家将新企业进入模型化为企业家的理性自选择过程,并通过实证分析验证在不同法治水平下,经济自由化对新企业进入的影响。结果表明,经济自由化在法治水平较低的时候,对新企业进入率有负面影响,在法治水平超过一定临界值后,才能够促进新企业进入,降低非正式经济比重。

关键词法治水平;经济自由化;新企业进入

中图分类号:F11-00 文献标识码: A

8、标题:寻租型监管者最优执法与利益集团游说博弈

编辑:刘白兰 邹建华

本文通过构建一个游说博弈模型,分析了证券市场上的各种利益集团如何游说监管者从而影响证券执法水平的。均衡结果显示,监管者有自身的寻租目标、上市企业内部人具有利用企业资源影响监管者的能力、机构投资者不能够获得执法水平的提高给外部投资者带来的全部收益、企业家在未来筹集资本的兴趣降低了但并未消除既有上市企业内部人攫取控制权私利所造成的扭曲等都是导致均衡证券执法水平非最优的因素。当监管者分配给自身寻租目标的权重越小、“游说技术”水平越低、股权集中度越高,控制权私利水平越低,证券执法水平越高,投资者保护水平越高。

关键词证券执法;利益集团;游说博弈;中小投资者保护

中图分类号:F830.91 文献标识码:A

9、标题:秩序演变与中国农村改革――一个合约的视角

编辑:朱有志 肖卫

【摘 要】本文从合约的视角分析中国农村改革秩序微观构架与演变。大家认为,秩序的微观结构是一个合约的网络,秩序也是合约均衡的结果。中国农村改革过程中,从土地改革到以家庭联产承包责任制为基础的统分双层经营体制,是一个农村市场化进程中合约完善的过程,合约对组织中农户的激励与监督效果直接影响改革的成效。

【关键词】秩序;合约;农村改革

中图分类号 文献标识码:A

10、标题:村民自治中贿选现象的法经济学分析

编辑:乔晓楠

【摘 要】本文从村民与村干部之间的委托代理关系入手,针对村民自治中的贿选现象进行了法经济学分析。文章借助产业组织理论对贿选过程中参与人的行为进行了说明,探讨了在治理成本一定的条件下,村民和村干部在选举过程中的策略选择。大家发现虽然贿选破坏了民主选举的公平性,但是如果通过立法方式在事前禁止贿选行为却反而会降低村民的福利水平。因此,根治贿选不能单纯地依靠选举前的制裁,而必须通过制度改革与法律援助来降低选举后的治理成本。

【关键词】贿选 法经济学 权利

中图分类号:F08 文献标识码:A

11、标题:最优部分所有权:企业和农户间契约稳定性的制度基础

编辑:徐忠爱

【摘 要】借鉴美国和日本企业治理的有益经验,本文对决定最优部分所有权安排的因素进行了模型化分析。最优部分所有权诱致农户进行定制产品的专用性投资,并且持续地生产供特定企业使用的投入品。本文分析的结论是,以一定比例股权联结的部分所有权安排,是有别于长期契约安排的另一种有效的履约机制。这种最优部分所有权是激励企业和农户进行关系专用性投资、减少不确定性和机会主义行为的一种可信承诺,也是最大化企业交易价值的制度安排。

【关键词】企业; 农户; 部分所有权;履约机制

中图分类号: F270.1 文献标识码:A

12、标题:经济人假设的分析范式研究

编辑:李学迎 李振宇

经济人假设是经济学的基石,且争议颇多。本文从分析范式角度出发,对经济人假设的哲学基础及其包含的目标、能力与行动进行分析,把经济人假设概括为自利的形而上学范式、最大化的社会学范式、理性的构造范式三个层次。经济人具有的理性能力构成保护带保护最大化内核,尽管不同的构造范式反例对最大化的社会学范式构成了挑战,然而还没有一个合适的范式来替代,只能对其进行相应的修正。

关键词:经济人假设 自利的形而上学范式 最大化的社会学范式 理性的构造范式

中图分类号:F016 文献标识码:A

13、标题:“2008年中国制度经济学年会”会议综述

编辑:黎秀蓉

1. Title: Cognitive Rationality and Development of Evolutionary Economics’ Methodology

Author(s):Huang Kainan

Abstract: Based on the analysis on constructivist rationality and ecological rationality, the paper considers that because of the bounded cognition and complex world, the rationality is neither complete constructivist nor complete ecological, but is cognitive rationality. As a more general concept, cognitive rationality embodies the combination of cognitive sciences and economics, also can alleviate the conflict between evolutionary paradigm and constructivist paradigm. We then give a discussion of the cognitive rationality from three perspectives, namely biological evolution, individual psychology and social culture, which jointly define the nature and origin of cognitive rationality. Based on cognitive rationality, the paper analyses three kinds of individual behavioral model. Finally, we conclude that evolutionary economics’ methodology should be based on the interaction between individual behaviors and institution.

Keywords: cognitive rationality; constructivist rationality; ecological rationality; evolutionary economics’ methodology

JEL Classification: F0110; B0260; D7000

2. Title: Analysis on the Law-enforcement Selectiveness of Violation of State-owned Listed Companies

Author(s):Yang Xiaowei, Zhao Juan

Abstract:Violation of listed companies would undermine the legal rights and interests of investors. If it is more serious, investors will withdraw from the transaction which leads to under-investment and low efficiency to the stock market. As a result, China issued a series of laws and regulations to restrict the behavior of listed companies. However, in the actual regulation operation, the corresponding laws and regulations have not been effectively implemented. Regulators often choose over-regulation or under-regulation, and even sports-regulation on their own initiative based on different situations. This is called selective regulation or regulation selectiveness in this paper. The “selective regulation” in the connected transactions regulation of China’s listed companies based on the selective law-execution theory created by Dai Zhiyong and Yang Xiaowei will be analyzed in this paper.

Key Words:Direct Regulation Cost, Indirect Regulation Cost, Random Regulation, Selective Regulation

JEL Classifications: K42

3. Title: Tax Competition, Local Public Services, and Economic Performance during the Transition Period in China

Author(s):Sun Liumei Wang Zheng

Abstract:This paper aims to examine the tax competition pattern and its impact on local public services and economic performance during the transition period in China. Using a provincial panel from 1978 to 2005, we develop an empirical framework to identify the effects of inter-province tax competition. As the first step, a response function of tax rate is estimated and the existence of tax competition is confirmed in the form of tax mimicking. Besides, We also find a significant declining trend in the input-output efficiency of public services. In the second step, econometric methods are employed to identify the underlying mechanism from tax competition to economic performance. The main findings can be summarized as follows. First, tax competition as a policy tool does not improve the efficiency of public services. Moreover, it even causes the output of public services to decrease. Second, tax competition has positive impact on the economic performance. From a realistic point of view, this special relationship has much to do with China’s specific pattern of political promotion and the economic system of fiscal federalism, which is explained in detail in the paper.

Key Words:Tax competition; Public services; Economic performance; Panel data

JEL Classifications: H410

4. Title: Local Government Competition and Convergence of Economic Development Mode: A Case of Southern Jiangsu Province and Wenzhou

Author(s):Jiang Jing Chen Liu

Abstract:“Sounthern Jiangsu Mode” and “Wenzhou Mode” have long been two kinds of distinctive regional economic development modes. But in recent years, it is found that these two modes approach to a striking convergence. From the perspective of local government competition, this paper tries to explain this kind of convergence of economic development in the two regions. During the transitional period, China’s local governments are involved into “political tournament”, which is dominated by the GDP growth competition, and it will make the local government form short-term economic goal. Under the circumstance, local governments are restricted to limited competitive behaviors such as attracting foreign funds and reinforcing local economic reform. The convergence of local government’s competitive behavior contributes to the convergence of local economic development mode.

Key abstract: local government competition, economic development mode, convergence, Southern Jiangsu Mode, Wenzhou Mode

JEL Classifications:P26

5. Title: Institutional Change, Labor Mobility and Economic Performance

Author(s):Zhou Qin Du Kai Cai Yinyin

Abstract:An important premise of neoclassicism labor mobility is full freedom of movement. However, because of household registration and segmentation of employment market between Urban and rural, labor mobility is hindered by institutional constraint. This makes neoclassicism invalid in China. Therefore, based on neoclassicism theory, this article establishes equilibrium model of labor mobility under intuitional constraints, uses regional data of 1949-2006, observes the effect of institutional change on labor mobility and economic performance. The conclusion is that labor mobility in China accompanies with institutional constraint characteristic. Any important institutional change along with fluctuation of labor mobility and economic performance. Institutional change determines the velocity of labor mobility, and directly influences economic performance.

Key words:Institutional Constraint Dynamic Equilibrium Labor Mobility Economic Performance

JEL Classifications: J61

6. Title: Career Concern, Cooperation and Wage Contract

Author(s): HUANG Liang

Abstract:In the long-run repeated team relationship, performance based types of wage contract, the correlation between team members’ talents on their tasks, the correlation between external shocks of tasks are essential to motivate team members’ implicit incentives and their cooperation .This paper shows that if wage contract is non-contractible fixed wage contract, in order to promote team members’ career concern and their cooperation, under individual performance based wage contract, the correlation between team members’ talents on their tasks must be higher than the correlation between external shocks of tasks; while under team performance based wage contract, it can always motivate team members’ career concern and their cooperation, and is more effective to achieve.

Key words:career concern;cooperation;wage contract

JEL Classifications:C720, D820, J330

7. Title: Rule of LawFreedom of Economic and Firm Entry

Author(s):Yu Mingchao

AbstractIn order demonstrate the complexity of institution complementary, We take “rule of law” and “freedom of economic” index as two proxy to analysis the influence to new firm entry. We model the entry to formal economy or informal economy as a rational choice of entrepreneur’s. Then we enforce empiric analysis from a cross-country dataset, and find when the level of law is low, the influence of freedom to entry is negative, but when reached a threshold ,the effect turn to positive.

Keyword:rule of law; freedom of economic; new firm entry

JEL Classifications: P47 G31

8. Title: Optimal Law Enforcement of Rent-seeking Regulator and Interest Group Lobbying Game――In View of Minority Investor Protection

Author(s):Liu Bailan Zou Jianhua

Abstract:This paper has developed a model for analyzing how lobbying by interest groups affects the level of securities law enforcement. Our analysis has identified several factors that may lead the equilibrium level of law enforcement to be sub-optimal. These factors include the ability of corporate insiders to use the corporate assets they control to influence regulators, as well as the inability of institutional investors to capture the full value of efficient law enforcement for outside investors. The interest that entrepreneurs have in raising equity capital in the future reduces but does not eliminate the distortions that arise from insiders' interest in extracting rents from the capital that public firms already have. Decreasing regulators’ rent-seeking desire or “lobbying technology” and increasing ownership concentration could bring about lower private benefits of control, higher level of law enforcement and better minority investor protection.

Keywords:Securities Law Enforcement; Interest Group; Lobbying Game; Minority Investor Protection

JEL Classifications: D720 G180 Z100

9.Title: The Order Evolution and China’s Rural Reforming: Base on Contract

Author(s):Zhu Youzhi Xiao Wei

Abstract:This paper analyses the orders’ Microstructure and Evolution in the process of China’s rural reforming base on contract. We think, the orders’ Microstructure is a network of contracts, and the orders is the results of contract equilibrium. China’s rural reforming is a process of perfecting contracts from the land reform to the household contract responsibility system.

Key Word: Order; Contract; Rural reforming

JEL Classifications: Q13

10. Title: A Law and Economics Analysis on Bribe Election in Villagers’ Self-Governance

Author(s): Qiao Xiaonan

Abstract: This essay took a law and economics analysis on bribe election in accordance with the principal-agent relationship between villagers and village leader. Using the theory of industrial organization, the paper explained the behavior of player and strategy choice. Although bribe election undermined the fairness of the democratic election, to prohibit the practice in advance reduced the welfare of the villagers. Furthermore the author proved that there would still be farewell loss when vote transaction was forbidden. Thus to reduce the monitor cost by institution and law should be used to prevent bribe election.

Key Words: Bribe Election Law and Economics Right

JEL Classifications: K420, H110, C720

11. Title: Optimally Partial OwnershipThe Institutional Basic on Stability on Contracting Between Corporation and Farmers

Author(s): Xu Zhong-ai

AbstractIn virtue of experience on corporation governance in American and Japan, this paper analyses the ingredients on optimally partial ownership. Optimally partial ownership leads peasant households to specific investment for customization products, and continuously plunge specific products into specifically corporations. The conclusion after analysis is that, partial ownership arrangement by right of certain proportional stock is another effective super-market contractual enforcement institution different from long-term contract arrangement. This optimally partial ownership is a kind of believable promise to inspirit corporation and farmers investing specific assets, decreasing uncertainty and opportunism action as well as institutional arrangement for maximizing enterprise’s exchange value.

Key wordscorporation; farmers; partial ownership; enforcing mechanism

JEL Classsifications: Q12

12. Title: Analyzing the Paradigm of Economic Man

Author(s): Li Xueying Li Zhenyu

Abstract:the hypothesis of economic man is the foundation stone of economics, and there are the disputes. From the angle of paradigm, we analyses the philosophical foundation, goal, ability and action of economic man. It is summarized as three levels which are the self-regard of metaparadigm, the maximum of sociological the paradigm and rational of construct paradigm .The rational ability that economic man have forms a bracer to protect the kernel of maximum. Though different abnormal example of construct paradigm challenge the maximum of sociological paradigm, but it could not be substitute by others. What we can do is to revision to it only.

Key Words:Hypothesis of Economic Man Self-regard of Metaparadigm

Maximum of Sociological Paradigm Rational of Construct Paradigm

JEL Classifications: B00 B31

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