【摘 要】基于建构理性和演化理性的辨析，本文认为，由于认知的局限性和世界的复杂性，理性既不是完全建构也不是完全演化，而是一种认知理性。认知理性体现了认知科学和经济学的结合，是 一个更为一般化的理性概念，能够调和演化和建构的范式冲突。可以从三个维度来阐释认知理性，即生物演化维度、个体心理维度和社会学问维度，各个维度上认知变量的相互作用共同决定了个体认知理性的实质内涵。本文还探讨了三种（无意识、弱意识和强意识）个体认知行为模型。基于认知理性，文章最后指出，个体与制度构成了经济研究的二重本体，演化经济学的方法论应该基于个体与制度的互动主义。
【摘 要】 新古典劳动力流动模型的一个重要前提是劳动力可以自由流动。但是，由于我国劳动力户籍以及城乡就业市场分割等一系列制度条件约束，劳动力无法实现自由的流动，这就导致了不能将新古典方法直接应用于我国的现实分析。因此，在新古典理论模型的基础上，本文建立了制度约束条件下部门间劳动力流动的均衡模型，并运用1949―2006年我国各地区数据，系统考察制度变迁对劳动力流动和经济绩效产生的影响。研究认为，我国的劳动力流动带有明显的制度约束特征，每一次重大制度变迁的背后，都伴随着劳动力流动和经济绩效的起伏。制度变迁决定了劳动力的流动速度，并且直接影响了经济绩效。
【关键词】：经济人假设 自利的形而上学范式 最大化的社会学范式 理性的构造范式
1. Title: Cognitive Rationality and Development of Evolutionary Economics’ Methodology
Abstract: Based on the analysis on constructivist rationality and ecological rationality, the paper considers that because of the bounded cognition and complex world, the rationality is neither complete constructivist nor complete ecological, but is cognitive rationality. As a more general concept, cognitive rationality embodies the combination of cognitive sciences and economics, also can alleviate the conflict between evolutionary paradigm and constructivist paradigm. We then give a discussion of the cognitive rationality from three perspectives, namely biological evolution, individual psychology and social culture, which jointly define the nature and origin of cognitive rationality. Based on cognitive rationality, the paper analyses three kinds of individual behavioral model. Finally, we conclude that evolutionary economics’ methodology should be based on the interaction between individual behaviors and institution.
Keywords: cognitive rationality; constructivist rationality; ecological rationality; evolutionary economics’ methodology
JEL Classification: F0110; B0260; D7000
2. Title: Analysis on the Law-enforcement Selectiveness of Violation of State-owned Listed Companies
Author(s):Yang Xiaowei, Zhao Juan
Abstract:Violation of listed companies would undermine the legal rights and interests of investors. If it is more serious, investors will withdraw from the transaction which leads to under-investment and low efficiency to the stock market. As a result, China issued a series of laws and regulations to restrict the behavior of listed companies. However, in the actual regulation operation, the corresponding laws and regulations have not been effectively implemented. Regulators often choose over-regulation or under-regulation, and even sports-regulation on their own initiative based on different situations. This is called selective regulation or regulation selectiveness in this paper. The “selective regulation” in the connected transactions regulation of China’s listed companies based on the selective law-execution theory created by Dai Zhiyong and Yang Xiaowei will be analyzed in this paper.
Key Words:Direct Regulation Cost, Indirect Regulation Cost, Random Regulation, Selective Regulation
3. Title: Tax Competition, Local Public Services, and Economic Performance during the Transition Period in China
Author(s):Sun Liumei Wang Zheng
Abstract:This paper aims to examine the tax competition pattern and its impact on local public services and economic performance during the transition period in China. Using a provincial panel from 1978 to 2005, we develop an empirical framework to identify the effects of inter-province tax competition. As the first step, a response function of tax rate is estimated and the existence of tax competition is confirmed in the form of tax mimicking. Besides, We also find a significant declining trend in the input-output efficiency of public services. In the second step, econometric methods are employed to identify the underlying mechanism from tax competition to economic performance. The main findings can be summarized as follows. First, tax competition as a policy tool does not improve the efficiency of public services. Moreover, it even causes the output of public services to decrease. Second, tax competition has positive impact on the economic performance. From a realistic point of view, this special relationship has much to do with China’s specific pattern of political promotion and the economic system of fiscal federalism, which is explained in detail in the paper.
Key Words:Tax competition; Public services; Economic performance; Panel data
JEL Classifications: H410
4. Title: Local Government Competition and Convergence of Economic Development Mode: A Case of Southern Jiangsu Province and Wenzhou
Author(s):Jiang Jing Chen Liu
Abstract:“Sounthern Jiangsu Mode” and “Wenzhou Mode” have long been two kinds of distinctive regional economic development modes. But in recent years, it is found that these two modes approach to a striking convergence. From the perspective of local government competition, this paper tries to explain this kind of convergence of economic development in the two regions. During the transitional period, China’s local governments are involved into “political tournament”, which is dominated by the GDP growth competition, and it will make the local government form short-term economic goal. Under the circumstance, local governments are restricted to limited competitive behaviors such as attracting foreign funds and reinforcing local economic reform. The convergence of local government’s competitive behavior contributes to the convergence of local economic development mode.
Key abstract: local government competition, economic development mode, convergence, Southern Jiangsu Mode, Wenzhou Mode
5. Title: Institutional Change, Labor Mobility and Economic Performance
Author(s):Zhou Qin Du Kai Cai Yinyin
Abstract:An important premise of neoclassicism labor mobility is full freedom of movement. However, because of household registration and segmentation of employment market between Urban and rural, labor mobility is hindered by institutional constraint. This makes neoclassicism invalid in China. Therefore, based on neoclassicism theory, this article establishes equilibrium model of labor mobility under intuitional constraints, uses regional data of 1949-2006, observes the effect of institutional change on labor mobility and economic performance. The conclusion is that labor mobility in China accompanies with institutional constraint characteristic. Any important institutional change along with fluctuation of labor mobility and economic performance. Institutional change determines the velocity of labor mobility, and directly influences economic performance.
Key words:Institutional Constraint Dynamic Equilibrium Labor Mobility Economic Performance
6. Title: Career Concern, Cooperation and Wage Contract
Abstract：In the long-run repeated team relationship, performance based types of wage contract, the correlation between team members’ talents on their tasks, the correlation between external shocks of tasks are essential to motivate team members’ implicit incentives and their cooperation .This paper shows that if wage contract is non-contractible fixed wage contract, in order to promote team members’ career concern and their cooperation, under individual performance based wage contract, the correlation between team members’ talents on their tasks must be higher than the correlation between external shocks of tasks; while under team performance based wage contract, it can always motivate team members’ career concern and their cooperation, and is more effective to achieve.
Key words：career concern；cooperation；wage contract
JEL Classifications：C720, D820, J330
7. Title: Rule of Law，Freedom of Economic and Firm Entry
Abstract：In order demonstrate the complexity of institution complementary, We take “rule of law” and “freedom of economic” index as two proxy to analysis the influence to new firm entry. We model the entry to formal economy or informal economy as a rational choice of entrepreneur’s. Then we enforce empiric analysis from a cross-country dataset, and find when the level of law is low, the influence of freedom to entry is negative, but when reached a threshold ,the effect turn to positive.
Keyword:rule of law; freedom of economic; new firm entry
JEL Classifications: P47 G31
8. Title: Optimal Law Enforcement of Rent-seeking Regulator and Interest Group Lobbying Game――In View of Minority Investor Protection
Author(s):Liu Bailan Zou Jianhua
Abstract:This paper has developed a model for analyzing how lobbying by interest groups affects the level of securities law enforcement. Our analysis has identified several factors that may lead the equilibrium level of law enforcement to be sub-optimal. These factors include the ability of corporate insiders to use the corporate assets they control to influence regulators, as well as the inability of institutional investors to capture the full value of efficient law enforcement for outside investors. The interest that entrepreneurs have in raising equity capital in the future reduces but does not eliminate the distortions that arise from insiders' interest in extracting rents from the capital that public firms already have. Decreasing regulators’ rent-seeking desire or “lobbying technology” and increasing ownership concentration could bring about lower private benefits of control, higher level of law enforcement and better minority investor protection.
Keywords:Securities Law Enforcement; Interest Group; Lobbying Game; Minority Investor Protection
JEL Classifications: D720 G180 Z100
9.Title: The Order Evolution and China’s Rural Reforming: Base on Contract
Author(s):Zhu Youzhi Xiao Wei
Abstract:This paper analyses the orders’ Microstructure and Evolution in the process of China’s rural reforming base on contract. We think, the orders’ Microstructure is a network of contracts, and the orders is the results of contract equilibrium. China’s rural reforming is a process of perfecting contracts from the land reform to the household contract responsibility system.
Key Word: Order; Contract; Rural reforming
10. Title: A Law and Economics Analysis on Bribe Election in Villagers’ Self-Governance
Abstract: This essay took a law and economics analysis on bribe election in accordance with the principal-agent relationship between villagers and village leader. Using the theory of industrial organization, the paper explained the behavior of player and strategy choice. Although bribe election undermined the fairness of the democratic election, to prohibit the practice in advance reduced the welfare of the villagers. Furthermore the author proved that there would still be farewell loss when vote transaction was forbidden. Thus to reduce the monitor cost by institution and law should be used to prevent bribe election.
Key Words: Bribe Election Law and Economics Right
JEL Classifications: K420, H110, C720
11. Title: Optimally Partial Ownership：The Institutional Basic on Stability on Contracting Between Corporation and Farmers
Abstract：In virtue of experience on corporation governance in American and Japan, this paper analyses the ingredients on optimally partial ownership. Optimally partial ownership leads peasant households to specific investment for customization products, and continuously plunge specific products into specifically corporations. The conclusion after analysis is that, partial ownership arrangement by right of certain proportional stock is another effective super-market contractual enforcement institution different from long-term contract arrangement. This optimally partial ownership is a kind of believable promise to inspirit corporation and farmers investing specific assets, decreasing uncertainty and opportunism action as well as institutional arrangement for maximizing enterprise’s exchange value.
Key words：corporation; farmers; partial ownership; enforcing mechanism
JEL Classsifications: Q12
12. Title: Analyzing the Paradigm of Economic Man
Author(s): Li Xueying Li Zhenyu
Abstract:the hypothesis of economic man is the foundation stone of economics, and there are the disputes. From the angle of paradigm, we analyses the philosophical foundation, goal, ability and action of economic man. It is summarized as three levels which are the self-regard of metaparadigm, the maximum of sociological the paradigm and rational of construct paradigm .The rational ability that economic man have forms a bracer to protect the kernel of maximum. Though different abnormal example of construct paradigm challenge the maximum of sociological paradigm, but it could not be substitute by others. What we can do is to revision to it only.
Key Words：Hypothesis of Economic Man Self-regard of Metaparadigm
Maximum of Sociological Paradigm Rational of Construct Paradigm
JEL Classifications: B00 B31