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《制度经济学研究》第二十四辑标题、编辑、摘要、关键词
金沙电子游戏:2009年05月04日 00:00   编辑:lai   点击:[]

1、标题:最优公共支出的动态一致性问题

编辑:金戈 史晋川

【摘 要】本文考察了公共支出的动态一致性问题。如果公共支出以流量的形式进入生产函数和效用函数,那么对于公共支出可能具有的三种形态(生产性、消费性和生产-消费混合型支出),大家均发现,在最优私人资本积累的前提下,公共支出实现短期最优是实现长期最优的必要条件。这意味着最优公共支出(流量)在短期与长期之间具有稳健的动态一致性。然而当公共支出以存量的形式影响经济时,这种动态一致性将不再保持。据此,大家提出了使公共支出保持动态一致性的条件。

关键词最优公共支出 动态一致性 流量 存量

中图分类号:F810 文献标识码:A

2、标题:“平行志愿”录取机制研究

编辑:聂海峰 张琥

“平行志愿”录取机制是一种不同于传统“志愿优先”的录取机制,对该机制引起的教育改革的福利效应和考生的填报策略有关的问题的研究结果包括:相对于传统的“志愿优先”录取机制,这个制度变革对全体考生来说不是帕累托改进;其次,分析了“平行志愿”录取操作中的志愿数目限制只能填报3个学校的影响,增加考生可以填报的志愿学校数对低分考生不利;计算了考生信念是均匀分布时不同考生的均衡策略和在均衡中的录取概率分布。

关键词录取机制 不完全信息 均衡策略

中图分类号:F224.32 文献标识码:A

3、标题:风险、信息与企业重整――一个理论的考察

编辑:艾佳慧

企业重整的可行性和有效性都与信息、风险有关。通过建构一个不完美动态序贯博弈模型,文章将论证中国新破产法中引入的重整程序很可能不能实现立法者所希翼的拯救破产企业、促进社会利益的公共目标,在中国式市场经济的背景下,重整程序极可能成为破产企业及其管理层拖延破产清算时间、获得重整收益的策略工具和法律武器。对于市场经济中必然出现的“优胜劣汰”和企业破产,重要的是建立有效的资本市场和管理权市场,而不是设计一套以法院为主导力量的重整程序。

关键词风险信息企业重整机制设计

中图分类号:F063.1 文献标识码:A

4、标题:制度质量、晋升激励与地方政府行为――市场分割的微观说明

编辑:陈桦楠

本文针对中国经济转型中出现的市场分割现象,从微观角度考察了“锦标赛竞争”机制与地方政府“生产性公共物品”投入之间的关系,尝试将这两种因素纳入一种分析框架进行统一的论证,希望对地方政府行为得到更全面的说明。本文分析认为,晋升激励为核心内容的“锦标赛竞争”机制对于区域经济发展是否有作用,起多少作用要取决于该区域的经济类型与经济结构特点。

关键词制度质量、锦标赛竞争、晋升激励、地方政府行为、市场分割

中图分类号:F062.6 文献标识码:A

5、标题:政绩考核方式与省际边界区域经济协同发展――一个基于政治晋升模型的思考

编辑:丁建军 冷志明 杨宗锦

与现有相关文献的视角不同,本文从各省政府对本省边界地区政府官员政绩考核方式选择出发,在政治晋升机制框架下分析了省际边界区域经济协同发展的可能性及其需要满足的条件。文章认为,即便以经济增长速度作为地方政府官员晋升与否的考核指标,省政府对边界地区政府官员的政绩考核方式(与本省其他地区比,与临省边界地区比,综合比较)不同,也将对本省边界地区经济发展以及省际边界区域经济协同发展产生不同的影响。合适的考核方式不仅有利于激励边界地区政府官员努力发展经济,而且也有利于加强区域合作。因而,在现有的制度背景下,各省政府可以通过选择恰当的政绩考核方式来促进本省边界地区及省际边界区域经济的协同发展。

关键词考核方式 边界区域 政治晋升

中图分类号:F061.3 文献标识码:A

6、标题:公共政策、减贫与有利于穷人的经济增长――基于1995-2006年中国各省转移支付的分析

编辑:卢现祥 徐俊武

【摘 要】亚洲国家的经验表明,分配不均等的扩大部分抵消了经济增长对消除贫困的影响。不同的公共政策会影响到经济增长和收入分配,如何运用再分配政策调节不平等状况,对减贫和有利于穷人的经济增长模式至关重要。本文提出了一个分析转移支付和不平等水平与贫困率之间关系的框架,并对公共政策是否符合有利于穷人增长(PPG)的标准进行了分类和界定。实证结果显示,1995-2006年间转移支付的增加伴随着不平等程度的持续恶化与贫困率的略微上升,穷人从增长中受益的份额小于富人,并且收入分配格局不利于穷人,转移支付政策不符合有利于穷人的增长的标准。由地区差异过大带来的减贫效果下降和不利于穷人的增长模式,应当引起政策制定者的注意。

【关键词】有利于穷人的增长(PPG),减贫,公共政策

中图分类号:F019.6 文献标识码:A

7、标题:农业租佃关系中的交易成本与土地产权分散程度的决定

编辑:高彦彦 杨德才

本文运用租佃关系演变历史围绕交易成本变化分析市场、技术和制度对土地产权分散水平的影响。租佃关系中的劳动分工导致土地产权的分散化,并由此产生交易成本,但是,由此带来的专业化与分工的收益可以弥补交易成本损失。因此,土地产权的分散程度取决于两者之间的权衡。为了应对租佃关系中的交易成本,一方面要提高租佃关系所能承受的交易成本的能力,即通过扩大农产品市场规模和技术水平来增加分工与专业化的收益,另一方面则要通过合约调整(即租佃制度安排)来降低交易成本。然而,从租佃关系演变史来看,土地产权的分散程度与经济发展水平呈现出正向关系,从而交易成本亦处于不断增加之中,因此,农业发展中应对租佃关系中的交易成本的关键在于市场拓展和技术进步。

关键词租佃合约交易成本市场规模技术进步土地产权

中图分类号:F321.1 文献标识码:A

8、标题:农地非农化过程中收益分配制度变迁:博弈论视角的分析

编辑:马贤磊 曲福田

】本文在总结青木昌彦的比较制度分析理论的基础上,概括一个适用于分析制度形成和演变的一般性博弈分析框架,并使用该框架构建一个由土地发展权市场交换域和政治权力域构成的混合域博弈模型对我国近期的农地非农化收益分配机制的形成和演变进行制度经济学说明。结论指出农地非农化收益分配机制并不是中央政府单方面制定的法律政策,而是中央政府、地方政府和农民三个博弈主体在现有的管理体制、财政体制及土地产权制度下的博弈产物,由于这些外部环境短期内变化不大,所以目前的制度改革途径难以突破“锁住”效应。建议未来制度改革应该进一步加强对地方政府征地行为约束,提高中央政府和农民对地方政府过度征地行为的监督效率和惩罚力度;引入市场机制,加快农村集体土地产权市场建设。

关键词】土地收益 分配机制 制度演变 博弈论

中图分类号:F321.1 文献标识码:A

9、标题:利润最大化的理论困惑与现实困境:企业和谐发展目标的现实理论假说

编辑:周小亮 笪贤流

利润最大化是新古典经济学企业理论的一个硬核假设,自诞生以来一直饱受学界的质疑与批判。西方主流经济学坚持工具主义利润最大化的合理性,新制度经济学对其表现出暧昧的、变相肯定与支撑的态度,演化经济学拒绝利润最大化而认可满意假说;走出利润最大化的理论困惑与现实困境必须将制度约束、技术条件等因素纳入分析框架;进而文章尝试构建了企业和谐发展目标的现实理论假说:现阶段企业和谐发展的目标应是多维目标合体,即涵盖纯经济利润目标、发展目标、和谐目标以及企业社会责任四大层次的“广义的利润目标”,以助推社会主义改革现阶段企业实现科学、可持续与和谐发展。

关键词利润最大化;广义的利润目标;生产函数修正

中图分类号:F069.9 文献标识码:A

10、标题:损害具有相互性本质吗?――科斯思想中潜藏的计划观点

编辑:莫志宏 黄春兴

【摘 要】很多人认为科斯在《社会成本问题》一文中提出的“损害具有相互性本质”这个观点很新奇,也很有价值,这不仅是因为它颠覆了传统的因果观念,还因为从该观念出发可以导向有效率的资源配置结果。本文对此提出了质疑,认为,只有在0交易成本的理想化世界中,资源在冲突用途之间的协调问题才可以转化为资源配置问题,此时,“损害具有相互性本质”这个观念才成立,否则,问题就只能基于私有产权和自由协商来解决,而这也意味着此时该观念就不再具有适用性了。

【关键词】社会成本;资源配置;私有产权;交易成本;计划论

中图分类号F063.1 文献标识码:A

11、标题:国家的两种基本类型及其现实理解:基于社会契约角度的分析

编辑:朱富强

【摘 要】基于契约方地位和契约权内容这两个维度,国家可分为四类:掠夺型主权国家、人道型主权国家、集权型裁判国家、协作型裁判国家。特别是,从受让主体的地位关系角度,大家可以清晰地考察主权型和裁判型两类国家的性质及其演变,并由此考察政府的本质功能及其在社会经济发展中的实际行为。事实上,这种两类国家的划分也可与霍布斯和洛克的不同认识联系起来,并从冰岛与夏威夷的演化中得到历史证据。

【关键词】契约方地位、契约权内容、社会契约、暴力潜能

中图分类号:D031 文献标识码:A

12、标题:适应性效率与中国金融的发展:合同及其实施的作用

编辑:郁光华

【摘要】已有的文献对于中国经济发展的研究更多的侧重于经济改革、分权以及对于财产权利的界定和保护。从总体上分析经济活动主体的适应性效率,特别是关注他们对于正规和非正规合同安排的反复实验,尚未引起学术界足够的重视。本文描述和分析了产生于温州的一系列非正规合同和三个在中国越来越被广泛运用的正规合同安排,提出正规和非正规合同机制在中国经济发展中都扮演了举足轻重的角色。就正规合同与非正规合同彼此的关系而言,普遍的模式是一个从非正规走向正规的过程。在经济发展初期,经济活动主体依靠非正规的、自我实行的合同保证交易的进行;随着正规合同供给的增加,会逐渐转向应用这些正规的合同机制。

关键词】合同、合同实施、适应效率、经济发展

中图分类号:F83 文献标识码:A

Research of Institutional Economics Vol.2009, No.2

Title; Author(s); Abstract; Key Words; JEL Classifications.

1. Title: The Dynamic Consistency of Optimal Public Expenditure

Author(s):Jin Ge Shi Jinchuan

AbstractIn the paper, we study the dynamic consistency of optimal public expenditure. If the public expenditure enters the productive and consumptive functions in flow, it can be proved that the optimization conditions of public expenditure are the same in short-run and long-run under the premise of optimal capital accumulation, which implies that the dynamic consistency of optimal public expenditure (flow) holds between the short-run and long-run. While the public expenditure affects the economy in stock, however, the consistency no longer holds. Thus, we put forward the condition of holding dynamic consistency of public expenditure, which is separating of enterprise fromgovernment in short.

Key wordspublic expenditure dynamic consistency flow stock

JEL ClassificationsE61 H50 O41

2. Title: An Economic Analysis of the “Paralleling Preference” College Admission Mechanism

Author(s):Nie Haifeng Zhang Hu

Abstract:The welfare effect of the reformation of college admission mechanism and the strategies of students under the new mechanism are investigated. The “Paralleling Preference” Mechanism is different from the traditional “Preference First” Mechanism. But the reformation is not a Pareto improvement for all students. The increase of quota in submitted preference is disadvantageous to students with low scores. The equilibriums under the new mechanism are calculated when the students have the common independent and uniform beliefs.

Keywords:admission mechanism, incomplete information, equilibrium strategy

JEL Classifications:C78,D81,I29

3. Title: Risk, Information and Firm Reorganization: A Theory View

Author(s): Ai Jiahui

Abstract: The feasibility and the validity of the firm reorganization are related to risk and information. Through building a dynamic game model of incomplete information, this article demonstrates the present reorganization procedure might be defeated legislator’s expectation, such as saving firmon the brink of bankruptcyand promoting social well-being. An valid reorganization institution should based on a relative perfect capital market and an effective management right market instead of an court-leading procedure.

Key Words: risk information firm reorganization mechanism design

JEL Classifications: D02 D52 D81 D86 K22

4. Title: System Quality, Promotion Incentive Mechanism and the Local Government Behavior――A Micro-interpretation on Market Segmentation

Author(s):Chen Huanan

Abstract:Focusing on market segmentation during the economic transition in China, the paper analyzes the relationship between the so-called “championship competition” system and local government expenditure on “productive public goods”. We try to involve these two factors in explaining the local government behaviour. The paper concludes that, with promotion incentive mechanism centred, whether and how far the “championship competition” system would affect the regional economic growth depends on the economic structure and economic charecteristicin the region.

Key words:system quality, championship competition, promotion incentive, local government behaviour, market segmentation

JEL Classifications:D33 H42 K42

5. Title: Achievements Inspection Way and Coordinative Development of the Interprovincial Boundary Regional Economies ――with the Political Promotion Model

Author(s): Ding Jianjun Leng Zhiming Yang Zongjin

AbstractDifferent from the existing related literatures' angles of view, this article embarks from the achievements inspection ways which provincial governments used to assess their boundary area government officials, and it has analyzed the possibility and conditions of the interprovincial boundary regional economies’ coordinative development under the political promotion mechanism framework. The article proposed that even if promotes by the economic growth rate, the different achievements inspection way which provincial government selected (only compared with the other areas of its province, only compared with its’ neighbor province’s boundary areas, compared with both of the other areas of its’ province and its neighbor province’s boundary areas), would have the different influence to the boundary area economic development as well as the interprovincial boundary regional economies’ coordination. The proper achievements inspection way not only incentives the boundary area’s officials to develop economies, but also makes them to cooperate with their neighbor province’s boundary areas’ officials. Therefore, under the existing constitution background, the provincial governments may progress their boundary area’s economies and harmonize the interprovincial boundary regional economies’ development by choosing the appropriate achievements inspection way.

Key WordsInspection way; boundary region; coordinative development; politics promotion

JEL Classifications: D33 H42

6. Title: Public policies,Poverty Reduction and Pro-poor growth――An analysis based on transfer payments of provinces in China from 1995 to 2006

Author(s): Lu Xianxiang Xu Junwu

AbstractExperiences from Asian countries show that expansion of uneven distribution partially offsets the effect of poverty reduction owing to economic growth. Different public policies affect economic growth and income distribution, how to use redistribution policies to regulate inequality level, which is quitecrucial to reducepoverty and to build a pro-poor growthpattern.In this paper, we supply an analysis framework of transfer payments and the level of inequality and poverty rate , meanwhile define and classify standards of public policies in line with pro-poor growth (PPG). The empirical results show that the poor benefit from growth in the share is less than the rich, and the pattern of income distribution is not conducive to the poor, and the transfer policy is not pro-poor growth from 1995 to 2006 years. Therefore, policy makers should pay attention to theweakeningeffect in poverty reduction and not pro-poor growth pattern coming from the large regional disparities.

Key words: Pro-poor growth (PPG), poverty reduction,public policy

JEL classification: D31; D63; H22

7. Title: Transaction Costs in Agriculture Tenancy Relationship and the Determination of Fragment Level of Land Property Rights

Author(s):Gao Yanyan Yang Decai

Abstract:This paper analyzes the fragment level of land property rights in agriculture tenancy relationship according to three factors: market, technology and institution. The transaction costs in tenancy relationships are brought by fragment of land property rights due to labor division in tenancy relationship, but these costs can be made up by the gains from labor division and specialization. Thus, the tradeoff between the two forces determines the level of fragment. In order to cope with transaction costs, on the one hand, the ability to suffer higher transaction costs by expanding market size or improving technology level should be strengthened, and on the other hand, contractual arrangements should be used to reduce these costs directly. However, because transaction costs are always positive in the real world and keep increasing during the evolution of tenancy history, the agricultural economy cannot fulfill progress by reducing transaction costs through contractual (i.e. institutional) adjustment but can by technology promotion and market expansion. All above is proved by agricultural tenancy history.

Key Words:Tenancy contract, transaction cost, market size, technology progress, land property rights

JEL Classifications: N55 R52 O13

8. Title: The Change in the Benefit Distribution Institution of Farmland Conversion: An Analysis from Game Theory

Author(s): Ma Xianlei Qu Futian

Abstract:This paper develops a general game framework for analyzing institutional evolvement in light of the comparative institutional analysis theory by Masahiko Aoki. According to the general framework, it establishes a compound game model including land development right transfer and political power domains to explain the changes in the benefit distribution system of farmland conversion. It concludes that the actual benefit distribution system of land conversion is not simply the law and policies the central government constituted, but the game equilibrium arrived at by the central government, local governments and farmers based on the actual administration system, fiscal system and property right system of rural land. Because of little change in these exterior circumstances in short time, the present reforms of the benefit distribution system have not achieved the expected results. The policy implication indicates that the future reforms have to focus on: further constraining local governmental behaviors of land expropriation and enhancing the monitoring efficiency and disciplinal intension on illegal land expropriation of local governments; and introducing market mechanism and improving property right market of rural land.

Key words:land benefit distribution institution institutional evolvement game theory

JEL Classifications: D02 D73 Q15

9. Title: The Theoretical And Practical Dilemma Of Profit Maximization: The Practical And Theoretical Hypothesis Of The Goal Of Harmonious Development In Enterprises

Author(s):Zhou Xiaoliang Da Xianliu

Abstract:Profit Maximization is a hard-core assumption of the firm's theory in Neo-Classical Economics, which has been questioned and criticized by scholars since coming up. Mainstream Economics holds rationality of Profit Maximization as instrumentalism, and New Institutional Economics supports it indirectly and Evolution Economics rejects Profit Maximization but prefers contentment hypothesis; To solve the theoretical and practical dilemma of Profit Maximization, we ought to make it include institution and technology and so on; To have further reflection and discussion of maximize profits, we build theoretical hypothesis of harmonious development for enterprises' goal: Enterprises' goal of harmonious development at this stage should be to fit the multi-dimensional target to boost the reform of the socialist and help realize scientific, harmonious and sustainable development in enterprises at the present stage, that is, “Goal Of Generalized Profit” such as covering pure economic profit, development, harmony as well as corporate social responsibility.

Key words:Profit maximization; Goal Of Generalized Profit; Modification of production function

JEL Classifications:B21 D21

10. Title: Is Harm of Reciprocal Nature?――On the Planning Mind-set Implicit in Coase’s Thought

Author(s): Mo Zhihong Huang Chunxing

AbstractMany people think that the idea “harm is reciprocal”proposed by Coase in his “on Problem of Social Cost” is both novel and valuable, since it not only subverts traditional conception of causality, also can lead to efficient allocative results. This article disputes this, arguing that only in the ideal world with zero transaction costs, where the coordinating problem between conflicting uses of the same recourses can be transformed into an allocative problem, could the idea “harm is reciprocal” be hold, or else the problem can only be resolved based on private property rights and free negotiation, and in this situation the idea “harm is reciprocal” cannot hold any more.

Key Words:social cost; resource allocation; private property; transaction cost; planning mind-set

JEL Classifications: B25

11. Title: The Two Basal Kinds of Country and Its Realistic UnderstandingAn Analysis Based on the View of Social Contract

Author(s):Zhu Fuqiang

Abstract:The countries can be classified into four kinds based on the contractors’ status and the content of contract rights: predatory sovereign states, humane sovereign states, centralized juridical states and cooperative juridical states. This paper examines emphatically the nature and evolution of two kinds of countries based on the dimensionality of the contractors’ status: centralized states and juridical states, and distinguish the difference of function of these two governments. Meanwhile, this paper gets the theory back to the literature of Hobbes and Locke as well as gets some historical evidence from the example of Iceland and Hawaii.

Key words:Contractors’s Status; Content of Contract; Social Contract; Violence Potential

JEL Classification: H11 K00

12. Title: Adaptive Efficiency and Financial Development in China: The Role of Contracts and Contractual Enforcement

Author(s):Yu Guanghua

Abstract:The existing literature on China’s economic development focuses more on economic reform, decentralization, and the clarification and protection of property rights. There is inadequate attention being paid to the adaptive efficiency of economic actors in general and in experimenting with informal and formal contractual arrangements in particular. In this article, Guanghua Yu documents and analyzes the informal contracts developed in Wenzhou and three formal contractual arrangements increasingly in wide use in China. He argues that both informal and formal contractual mechanisms play important roles in China’s economic development. The general pattern appears to be that economic actors rely on self-enforcing informal contractual arrangements during the early state of economic development and adopt more formal arrangements when these are feasible.

Key words: contract; contractual enforcement; adaptive efficiency; economic growth

JEL Classifications: D02 K12

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