金沙电子游戏,澳门皇冠金沙网站官方网站

   
 English  邮箱登录
金沙电子游戏 学院概述 师资队伍 社科基地 学术刊物 学术信息 论坛会议 研究生教育 合作交流 培训教育 留学生 就业
公告栏 更多>> 
友情链接  
耶鲁大学
北京大学国家发展研究院
康奈尔大学
哈佛大学
普林斯顿大学
芝加哥大学
厦门大学经济学院
联系大家  
通讯地址:山东省济南市山大南路27号金沙电子游戏
邮政邮编:250100
联系电话:0531-88364000 88364128
传 真:0531-88364981
电子信箱:cer@sdu.edu.cn
当前位置: 金沙电子游戏 >> 学术刊物 >> 制度经济学研究 >> 正文
《制度经济学研究》2010年第3期(总第29辑)标题、摘要、关键词等
金沙电子游戏:2010年09月16日 00:00   编辑:金沙电子游戏整理   点击:[]

《制度经济学研究》2010年第3期(总第29辑)标题、摘要、关键词等

1、标题:权力演化与国家竞争:一个基于国家间交易成本的考察

编辑:杜 凯周 勤汪 建

【摘 要】本文在国家竞争与交易成本基础上提出了三个命题:制度设计的双向效应,经济增长的双重机制,以及国家竞争的本质。制度设计的双向效应是指从协作和竞争的视角来看,现实中既有旨在降低交易成本的制度设计,也有旨在提升交易成本的制度安排。技术不仅是一种增长要素,更是一种竞争要素,这就造就了经济增长的双重机制:产出的绝对增长和竞争抑制下的相对增长。权力是国家竞争的本质,技术的制度属性是国家竞争权力的来源。国家在权力的基础上实现交易成本的分配,“自然选择”的演化过程决定了权力本身是路径依赖的,因此国家间交易成本必然向权力派生的成本收敛。本文为拓展经济增长研究提供了一个新的思路。

【关键词】国家竞争;权力;交易成本;演化

中图分类号:F063.1 文献标识码:A

2、标题:分工演进、交易效率与中国农村非正规金融组织变迁

编辑:郭梅亮 徐璋勇

本文尝试以分工理论为基础,以交易效率为主线,构造出关于分工演进――交易效率――非正规金融组织变迁的理论框架,在这框架中对中国农村非正规金融组织变迁的历史演进过程进行分析,力求保持中国农村非正规金融发展历史和逻辑的统一。本文认为交易条件变化所带来的交易费用大小是大家理解农村非正规金融变迁的重要线索。农村非正规金融变迁的过程实际上是农村金融分工演进而带来的交易费用不断降低的过程。因此对于中国农村金融市场而言,政府认可并不意味着农村金融制度安排有效,判断一种农村金融制度安排是否有效关键还在于其能否带来交易费用的节约。

关键词农村非正规金融 分工演进 交易效率

中图分类号:F830.6 文献标识码:A

3、标题:超边际分析视角下的中国土地发展权与征地效率――基于效率与公正的内洽假设

编辑:李子明 周群力

在城市化进程中,中国政府通过征收农村集体土地的过程中存在对农户的补偿不足。在土地财政模式和公有制下,农民缺乏法律支撑和议价的能力,致使补偿不能按土地的真实价值或以前经营土地所带来的收益所衡量的标准进行。土地终极产权的争议往往牵涉意识形态而被搁置,因此本文从内生交易成本角度,基于效率与公正内洽的前提引入按土地使用对象和用途划分的土地发展权结构,借鉴新兴古典经济学超边际分析方法构建市场条件下自给自足型、完全分工型和混合型的产权结构,以发展权的价值实现来评估假设的发展权交易市场产权结构与实际的差异。根据多方参与者利益均衡的比较,研究农村土地流转中非理性行为的根源和公正与效率并重的实现方式;引入成都和温江土地流转改革的案例分析进一步探讨土地征用机制效率与公正性的实现。

关键词土地发展权 征地 超边际分析

中图分类号:F321.1 文献标识码:A

4、标题:工人权利受损原因的产权经济学分析

编辑:于桂兰 郑秀芝

【 摘 要】雇佣契约是雇主和工人之间的人力资本产权交易契约;由于雇佣契约的不完全,工人权利在雇佣契约中无法得到完全的界定;由于工人权利的不完全界定,使工人的一些权利处于雇主和工人之间的“公共领域”;由于产权交易中存在着“强权界定产权”规则,使处于强权地位的雇主能够攫取处于“公共领域”的工人权利。本文对理解工人权利被侵犯的根源、劳动合同法的价值以及工会在劳动关系中作用,从产权经济学角度提供了理论依据。

【 关键词 】劳动关系 工人权利 人力资本产权 契约不完全性 公共领域

中图分类号:F246 文献标识码:A

5、标题:中国地区经济的收敛性分析――基于全要素生产率的视角

编辑:王珏 宋文飞 韩先锋

【摘 要】2003年以后中国东、中、西三大地区的经济趋同问题引起了学术界的注意和讨论。本文从全要素生产率的角度考察,认为:一是要素投入会弱化全要素生产率的收敛性;二是对外开放水平和政府干预对全要素生产率收敛性的影响较大;三是技术进步对全要素生产率收敛性的影响显著。这对于区域经济协调发展的启示在于:在必需的要素投入增加的基础上,西部地区在技术水平、对外开放程度和经济体制改革等方面要多下力气。由于中国的工业化进程远未完成,刘易斯转折点的来临或许是一个信号。

【关键词】全要素生产率 区域经济 经济趋同

中图分类号:F120.3 文献标识码:A

6、标题:一人企业的经济学说明

编辑:高明华 柯希嘉

【摘 要】有别于以往从法学角度分析一人企业的思路,本文采用新制度经济学的研究方法对一人企业承担有限责任的合理性及其外部性的分担问题进行了分析。本文首先运用成本-收益的分析方法对一人企业、无限责任企业和投资他人企业的情况进行了比较,明确了一人企业存在的合理性。接下来运用佃农理论对一人企业的外部性分担问题进行了分析。最终本文的结论是一人企业有其存在的合理性,其外部性可以被有效分担。因此,一人企业的形式可以被广泛采用。

【关键词】一人企业 经济学说明 合约理论

中图分类号:F063 文献标识码:A

7、标题:犯罪率的增长及其差异:正式与非正式社会支撑和保障的视角――基于中国1998-2006省际面板数据的实证研究

编辑:郑筱婷 蓝宝江

改革开放三十年来中国总体犯罪率持续上升。本文从经济学的视角研究影响犯罪率的因素。本文控制了警费支出的力度、失业率、制造业平均工资、男女性别比、收入不平等、经济增长率等因素的影响,发现非正式迁入率对犯罪率的影响显著为正,正式迁入率对犯罪率的影响显著为负,支撑了获得正式制度的支撑和保障有助于减少犯罪的假说;省内正式迁入率对犯罪率的影响显著为负而省外正式迁入率却不显著,支撑了非正式制度的支撑有助于减少犯罪的假说。但是社会人口流动频率的增大对于犯罪率的影响不显著,即未发现非正式制度的约束对犯罪率有显著影响。本文还发现提高制造业平均工资和经济增长率能显著降低犯罪率,这也支撑了犯罪会随着机会成本的提高而减少的经济学说明。

【关键词】迁移 流动 犯罪 正式与非正式支撑 非正式约束

中图分类号:F061.3 文献标识码:A

8、标题:法律保护对中国经济增长的影响:分省面板数据的证据

编辑:李春涛、薛奕、张璇

【摘 要】本文以索洛经济增长模型为基础,在控制人口增长与资本增长两个指标的前提下,根据中国大陆地区31个省、自治区、直辖市(简称省)2001-2005年间的面板数据,研究了法律保护对经济增长的影响。法律保护的程度由生产者合法权益的保护、消费者权益的保护和常识产权保护三个指标来衡量。研究发现消费者合法权益的保护、常识产权保护与GDP增长之间存在着显著的正相关关系,生产者合法权益的保护对GDP增长率也有微弱的正面影响;其次,考虑到各省、区之间的差异性,本文又利用面板数据的固定效应模型对上述三个法律保护指标与GDP增长率之间的关系做了进一步的分析,结果再次验证了法律保护与经济增长之间的显著正相关关系。本研究成果不仅有力地驳斥了Franklin et al(2004)关于中国法律与经济增长无关的论断,而且对中西部欠发达地区乃至我国经济发展政策的设计有重要的参考意义。

【关键词】法律保护、经济增长、生产者权益保护、消费者权益保护、常识产权保护

中图分类号:F063.1 文献标识码:A

9、标题:破产受偿规则、债权人利益冲突以及经济学解决方法

编辑:江清云

【摘 要】企业在融资过程往往提供了大部分的财产作为担保,相对有担保债权人,未设定担保的债权人在企业破产时通常只能获得很少比例的赔偿。同时,由于投资风险偏好的差异,借款人可能通过高风险的投资使得投资风险外部化,并使原先的债权人遭受损失,因此,不同的破产受偿规则将会引起不同的事前和事后激励效果。另外,在破产清算和破产重整问题上,效率观点作为权衡方法是必不可少的。本文在对不同的破产受偿规则进行效率分析和比较的同时,对我国新破产法的企业破产清算和重整过程中的激励问题进行评析。

【关键词】破产受偿规则、债权人利益冲突、破产清算和重整

中图分类号:D913.99 文献标识码:A

10、标题:三峡外迁农村移民生活满意度及影响因素分析――以山东省广饶县移民安置点为例

编辑:李增刚 夏永侠

【摘 要】以山东省广饶县三峡外迁农村移民为例,选取了移民补偿、生产收入、后期扶持、生产生活适应、人际关系和政治参与度六大指标,并细分为30个小指标,研究了三峡移民的生活满意度。调查表明,三峡外迁农村移民的生活满意度不高,仅为0.48,尚未达到基本满意的水平。在六大指标中,仅有生产收入和生产生活方式两项指标达到了基本满意水平,分别为:0.548和0.64;其他各项指标均低于0.5。究其原因,主要在于:移民补偿标准不合理;后期政策扶持不到位;社会关系网络的破坏以及政治参与度不高等。

【关键词】三峡外迁农村移民 生活满意度

中图分类号:F061.4 文献标识码:A

11、标题:地方政府短视偏差、行政拖延与锁定强制――一票否决考核制度的行为经济学分析

编辑:叶德珠

由于存在“短视”认知偏差,地方政府在跨期计划实行时会出现时间不一致结果,形成持续的拖延,使实际任务完成偏离最优水平。“一票否决”作为中央政府对地方政府的一种强制考核制度,起着一种最后期限式的锁定作用,可以帮助地方政府克服认知偏差,达到最优任务完成水平。本文以行为法经济学模型演绎结论为依据得出“一票否决”的作用条件和适用范围,为评价和规范目前广泛开展的“一票否决”行为提供参照系,以促进行政效率的提高。

关键词短视 双曲线贴现 锁定 一票否决行政考核

中图分类号: F063.2 文献标识码:A

12、标题:长期增长与计划生育政策的宏观总评述

编辑:周炎 陈昆亭

【摘 要】长期增长问题归根到底是人的问题,或人力资本积累问题。中国1980年前后开始的计划生育政策,不但缓解了当时中国生产力低下的情况下人口进一步增长的压力,同时根本上扭转了朝向低水平均衡发展的方向,启动了中国工业化进程所需的(技术型)劳动的后备工程。虽然这一政策经过数年的作用之后,引起了人口结构老龄化问题,性别比例失调问题,以及总体人力资本积累增长滞后的趋势值得关注。但本文研究认为,在传统生育学问背景下,计划生育政策仍将发挥正效应作用。解决人口结构问题的关键在于‘好的教育’---机会平等的和先进的教育。教育问题解决好了,人口结构问题,收入差异问题以及长期增长问题都能得以解决。退出计划生育政策为时尚早。

【关键词】计划生育政策,长期增长,内生人力资本积累模型

中图分类号:F063.1 文献标识码:A

13、标题:地方官员行为与经济发展:一个基于政治晋升、财政分权与腐败的文献综述

编辑:郭广珍

【摘 要】地方官员的行为被认为是影响发展中国家经济发展的重要因素,一般认为地方官员通过三个途径对经济发展产生影响,即政治晋升、财政分权和腐败。本文在对各方面的文献进行了梳理和分析时,试图将这三方面的文献放在一个统一的框架中。而且,大家认为在没有弄明白官员行为的情况下,就去研究官员行为如何影响其他变量的做法是不恰当的,因此大家还对影响地方官员自身行为的相关文献也进行了综述。

【关键词】政治晋升; 财政分权; 腐败

中图分类号:F063.1 文献标识码:A

14、标题:中东经济落后的制度原因:一个历史视角

编辑:蒂姆?古兰

译者:张清津

【摘 要 】公元1000年左右,中东的经济并不落后,但到了18世纪,其经济落后已非常明显。这种转变发生的原因是,当欧洲的对手大力发展现代经济时,该地区的制度却停滞不前。在阻碍进步的制度中,有伊斯兰继承法,它抑制了资本积累;有伊斯兰法中企业概念的缺乏,它导致了公民社会的薄弱;还有伊斯兰宗教与社团组织,它为了提供社会服务,将大量的资源禁锢于非生产性组织之内。这些阻碍经济发展的障碍大多数都已被肇始于19世纪的改革所克服。但是,伊斯兰法仍然是导致中东经济发展失败的一个因素。

【关键词】伊斯兰继承制度;伊斯兰宗教与社团组织;法人团体;公民社会

中图分类号:F069.9 文献标识码:A

15、标题:2010年制度经济学国际研讨会综述

编辑:孙涛等

Search of Institutional Economics, Vol.2010 No.3

Title; Author(s); Abstract; Key WordsJEL Classifications

1TitleEvolution of Power and National Competition: An Investigation on Transaction Costs among Countries

Authors):Du Kai Zhou Qin Wang Jian

AbstractAccording to country competition and transaction cost , we have put forward three propositions: dual effect of institutional arrangement and economic growth, essence the country competition. The dual effect of institutional arrangement is in reality, the institutional arrangement reducing or raising transaction cost is both existing. Technology is not only a growth factor, but also a competitive element which created the dual mechanism of economic growth. Power is the essence of national competition, and institutional property of technology is the source of national competitive power. The distribution of transaction costs among countries are based on the power, and "natural selection" determines that the evolution of power itself is path dependent. Therefore, transaction costs among countries are bound to converging toward the power. This article provides a new thinking for the research on economic growth.

Key wordsNational Competition Power Transaction Costs Evolution

JEL Classifications: O17

2TitleThe Division of Labor Evolution, Transaction Efficiency and China’s Rural Informal Financial Organization Changes

Authors):Guo Meiliang Xu Zhangyong

Abstract:This article attempts to take the division of labor as a theory foundation, the transaction efficiency as the main line, and constructs a theoretical framework about the division of labor evolution--transaction efficiency--informal financial organization changes, analyzing the historical process of China’s informal financial organization changes in this framework,hoping to keep china’s rural informal finance development consistent in the history and logicality. This article holds that the size of transaction costs which are brought by the terms of trade changing are the important clue to the understanding of the rural informal financial changes. The informal financial change in fact is the process of the transaction cost reducing unceasingly brought by the rural finance division of labor evolution. Therefore, in China’s rural finance market, a kind of rural finance institutional arrangement is effective or not is due to that it can bring the transaction cost saving , not the government approving.

Keywords:rural informal finance, the evolution of division of labor, transaction efficiency

JEL Classification:B12 G21 Q14

3TitleInframarginal Analysis on ChineseLand Development Rights andLand Expropriation’s Efficiency: Based on the Internal Coherence of Efficiency and Justice

Authors):Li Ziming Zhou Qunli

Abstract:In urbanization, Chinese government expropriates collective-owned rural land and then sells the use right to developers. As the land finance system and public-owned economy, peasants gain under-compensation but have no power and legislative support to demand the true value and benefit from the land once they managed. Definite ultimate landed property of Chinese would hardly be transformed into private ownership as it maybe involves in the heated debate of ideology which may put off the solution to the conflicts in reality. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate the institutions from the scope of endogenetic transaction cost when we take internal coherence of justice and efficiency as individual’s behavior assumption. This papers unpacks land development rights according to variety of usages for participants both in urban and rural areas and build up value equilibrium in a given property rights exchange market, which is a benchmark to reveal hidden relationship of improper behaviors in the land conversion and evaluate how big is big of under-compensation. As the corner solution of land use in reality, it introducesinfra-marginal analysisof New Classical Economics and valued the proper structure of property rights among autarkic, pure specialized and mixed patterns when the rural households, rural collective and urban developers’ bargain power varied. Finally, according to a case study of rural land circulation reform in Wenjiang, Chengdu in China to confirm the alternative way of property rights exchange, it makes a deduction on the dialectical relation amonginternal coherence of efficiency and justice,theendogenetic transaction costand institutional change, which also shows the direction of Chinese land reform.Above all, it would give a lesson to Chinese transformation of land property right and the promising land development rights market in the future.

Key Words:Land Development Rights;Land Expropriation;Inframarginal Analysis;Justice;Efficiency

JEL Classifications: Q15 R14 K11

4TitlePropertyRightsEconomical Analysis on the Workers'RightsVoilation

Authors):Yu Guilan Zheng Xiuzhi

AbstractThe reason of workers'rightsvoilationis that the employment contract is incomplete, so the workers'rightsis unable to be defined completely in the labor contract, thus somerightsof workersarelocated in “ public domain” between the employer and the worker. Moreover, because in the property right transaction there exists the rule of “ might makes right”, the employer who is on mighty status can seize the workers'voilationin “ public domain”. Therefore, in the initial contract, the workers'rightsshould be defined clearly and completely to reduce the scope of worker'srightsin “public domain”. Simultaneously enhancing the ability and diligenty of trade uninon and tripartite , such as labor dispute mediation arbitration facilities, trial organization and the government law-enforcing departments, which not only guarantees the clearly defined workers'rightsto be enforced in the contract implementation, but also makes sure the workers'rightsnewly appeared in “public domain” with changing situation, obtaining dynamic boundary and realization.

Key wordslabor relations worker’s rights incomplete contract public domain

JEL ClassificationsJ0 J70

5TitleConvergence of China's regional economic analysis――Based on the perspective of total factor productivity

Authors):Wang Jue Song Wenfei Han Xianfeng

AbstractAfter the year2003, the economy restraining of the three areas of China arise discussion on the issue. If we use entire essential factor productivity as a tool to analyze the phenomenon, we will find the big disparity between the east, middle and west region. The following several factors are very outstanding for the entire essential factor productivity restraining: factor input, technology, opening level and government. So we get enlightment for West China to make more effort in these points. Anyway, as the industrialization of China is still on the way, the Louis turning point may be a very important symbol.

Keywords:entire essential factor productivity; regional economy; Economic convergence

JEL Classifications: R11 R58

6TitleEconomic Interpretation of One-Man Company

Authors):Gao minghua Ke xijia

Abstract:In this paper, authors explain the rationality of that one-man company burdens limited liability and what externality of one-man company is and how to be shared, applying the research methods of the new institutional economics different from previous research methods from the view of laws. Firstly, authors apply cost-benefit analytical method to research the question of rationality by comparing three different organizations. Then, apply Steven Cheung's theory of share tenancy to analyze the question of externality. At last, come to conclusion that one-man company is one type of rational organizations needed to be popularized.

Keywords: One-man Company, Economic Interpretation, Contract Theory

JEL ClassificationsD24,C11,C53

7TitleThe Effects of Formal and Informal Support and Constraints on Crime Rate: An Empirical Study

Authors):Zheng Xiaoting Lan Baojiang

Abstract:The crime rate of China was increasing since the reform and open policies was implemented. The argument that the increase is migrants’ fault is not sound and tested. The paper uses the crime economics theory crime as criterions in choosing the factors affect crime rate. The paper investigates the effects of the static population composition and dynamic of social structure on crime rates. The police expenditure, unemployment, construction industrial average wage, sex ratio, inequality, growth, and et al. controlled, informal migration rate has significantly positive effects on crime rate, while the formal migration rate has negative and insignificant effects on crime rate supporting more formal support can reduce crime rate. The formal migration can be divided to migration inside the province and outside the province. The coefficient of inside province migration rate is negative but outside province migration rate is positive which support the hypothesis that informal support can reduce crime rate. The mobility of society is not very significant which mean the informal constraints if not important in reducing crime rate. The paper also finds that increase of average wage of manufacturing sectors and growth can significantly decrease crime rate. This also support increasing opportunity cost will reduce crime rate.

Key Words:migration mobility crime rate formal and informal support informal constraints

JEL ClassificationsO15 K42 R23

8TitleLegal Protection and Economic Growth: Evidence from China’s cross Provincial Level Panel Data

Authors):Li Chuntao Xue Yi Zhang Xuan

AbstractUsing a panel data set of China’s 31 provincial regions from 2001 to 2005, this research documents a positive effect of legal protection on China’s economic growth. Legal protection is measured by three indices, namely the protection of producers’ interests, the protection of consumers’ interests and intellectual prosperity rights. With an augmented Solow Growth Model specification, this paper finds a positive relationship between legal protection and China’s economic growth. The result shows robustness with different specifications, including fixed effect models, which we believe has partially alleviated the endogenous and heterogeneous problems facing similar researches.

Key WordLegal Protection, Economic Growth, Consumer’s Rights Protection, Producer’s Rights Protection, Intellectual Property Rights

JEL Classifications: K40 P14 O47

9TitleSatisfaction Rules, Interest Conflict of Creditors and Economic Solutions

Authors):Jiang Qing-Yun

Abstract: Companies have to provide most of its property as security for financing. Compared with secured creditors, non-secured creditors normally are very less satisfied in case of bankruptcy liquidation. Moreover, the borrowers may externalize credit risk due to their attitude to investment risk and thus cause loss to the formal creditors. As a consequence, different satisfaction rules may lead to ex ante and ex post incentive effect. Additionally, efficiency consideration is critical in respect of liquidation and reorganization. In this context, this article is to analyze and compare the efficiency of different satisfaction rules in bankruptcy and comment on the incentive problem in the new Chinese Bankruptcy Law, especially on liquidation and reorganization.

Key Word:Bankruptcy Satisfaction Rules, Liquidation and Reorganization, Evaluation

JEL Classifications:K21

10TitleResearch on Life Satisfaction of the Three Gorges Rural Relocated Immigrants

――Take the City Guangrao of Shandong Province As a Case

Author(s):Li Zenggang Xia Yongxia

Abstract:Takethe Three Gorges Rural Relocated Immigrantsof Guangrao (Shandong) as a case, using the index such asresettlement compensation, income level, latter support policy, production and living form, social relationship, and political participation, the paper studies life satisfaction ofthe Three Gorges Rural Relocated Immigrants. The survey suggests, the life satisfaction is low, only 0.48. In these six indexes, only theincome level and production and living form reach the basic satisfaction level, they are 0.548 and 0.64 respectively, the other indexes are lower than 0.5. The reasons are the standard of resettlement compensation is low; the latter support policy is not enforced adequately; the social relationship net is destroyed; and the political participation is low.

Key Words:Three Gorges Rural Relocated Immigrants Life Satisfaction

JEL Classifications:I31

11TitleLocal Government’s Myopia bias, Administration Delay and Commitment Enforcement----The behavior economics analysis on the administrativeassessment systemof one ballot veto

Authors):Ye Dezhu

Abstract: Due to the existence of cognitive bias of self-control insufficiency, the local government would see the outcome of time inconsistency in its carrying out the span-period plan, thus resulting in the continuous delay and deviating from the optimal level in the real completion of tasks. One ballot veto, as a compelling appraisal by central government to local governments, serves as the commitment of deadline, which can help local government overcome the cognitive bias and achieve optimum of implementing missions. This paper, according to the result of model deduction, gets the effective condition and applicable range of one ballot veto, which with the aim of appraising and standardization provides the widely ongoing action of one ballot veto with frame of reference, in order to raise the administrative efficiency.

Key words:myopia delay commitment one ballot vetoassessment system

JEL Classifications:D12 D91

12TitleA general comment on long run growth and the one-child policy in China

Authors):Yan Zhou Kunting Chen

Abstract:Long run economic growth bases on human capital in the last analysis. One-child policy was issued around1980 inChina, which mostly relaxed population pressure at that time when productivity was still very undeveloped. And it is also widely believed by many scholars that this policy has contributed to heighten worker’s average knowledge level and individual’s human capital level in next generation. Our recent study proved that it did also act as an important knob to switch an agricultural economy onto an industrialized path. However, after a more-than-twenty-years control on population growth, it has also left problems like accelerated ageing and abnormally high sex ratio. Our research implies the following points: first, under traditional cultural value of fertility, one-child policy will still work with positive effect. Secondly, the key point to solve the rising problems of population composition rests with good education. With advanced education, average level of human capital will he high, then, problems of population composition, income inequality, and long run economic growth can be solved together.

Keywords:one-child policy, long run economic growth, endogenous human capital model.

JEL Classifications: J13 J18

13TitleBehavior of Local Government OfficialsandEconomic Development: a LiteratureReview Based on Political Promotion, Fiscal Decentralization and Corruption Perspective

Authors):Guo Guangzhen

AbstractBehavior of local government officials is considered as an important factor of economic development. Generally, there are three ways that local officials can influence economic development, that is political promotion, fiscal decentralization and corruption. We give a literature review based on these three aspects, and attempted to put them into an unified framework. Obviously, it is not appropriate that studying how local officials affect other variables without researching local officials’ behavior itself, so we also summarized the papers which analyzes the factor that affect the behavior of local government officials.

Key WordsPolitical Promotion Fiscal Decentralization Corruption

JEL Classifications:H70 H77

14、Title: Institutional Causes of Economic Underdevelopment in the Middle East: a Historical Perspective

Author(s):Timur Kuran

Translator(s):Qingjin Zhang

AbstractAround the year 1000 the Middle East was not an economic laggard. However, by the 18th century it exhibited clear signs of economic backwardness. The reason for this transformation is that critical economic institutions of the region stagnated as their Western counterparts gave way to the modern economy. Among the institutions that generated evolutionary bottlenecks are the Islamic law of inheritance, which inhibited capital accumulation; the absence in Islamic law of the concept of a corporation and the consequent weaknesses of civil society; and the waqf, which locked vast resources into unproductive organizations for the delivery of social services. These obstacles to economic development were largely overcome through reforms that began in the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, traditional Islamic law remains a factor in the Middle East's ongoing economic disappointments.

Key Words:the Islamic law of inheritance the waqf corporation civil society

JEL Classifications:Z12

上一条:《制度经济学研究》2010年第4期(总第30辑)标题、摘要、关键词等 下一条:《制度经济学研究》2010年第2期(总第28辑)标题、摘要、关键词等

关闭

 

版权所有:金沙电子游戏(中心)
Copyright 2001-2010 The Center For Economic Research, Shangdong University, All Rights Reserved
XML 地图 | Sitemap 地图