题目：The Invisible Hand and the banking trade: seigniorage, risk-shifting, and more
演讲人：Professor Lei Zhang University of Warwick
The classic Diamond-Dybvig model of banking assumes perfect competition and abstracts from issues of moral hazard, hardly appropriate when considering modern UK banking. We therefore modify the classic model to incorporate franchise values due to market power; and risk-taking by banks with limited liability. We go further to show how the capacity of franchise values to mitigate risk taking may be undermined by the bailout option; with explicit analytical results provided for the case of extreme risk-aversion. After a brief discussion of how this may impact on the distribution of income, we outline the ways in which the Vickers Report seeks to remedy these problems.
Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL
PhD, University of Warwick, (1993). Title: “Stochastic Optimal Control and Regime Switching: Applications in Economics”. PhD awarded 1994.
MA programme in Economics, University of Warwick, (1987—1988). Passed all written examinations for MA in economics.
MSc programme in Management Sciences, Peking University, (1985—1987).
BSc in Space Physics, Peking University, (1981—1985)